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How Canadian Regulators Decide Whether a Breach Must Be Reported

By Yong DuPublished Reviewed

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One misdirected invoice had to be reported and another did not. Real Canadian breach decisions, case by case.

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A psychology practice emailed one client's invoice to the wrong client, and had to report it. A telecom emailed one customer's account number to the wrong customer, and did not. The tables below show real decisions from Canada's federal, Alberta and BC privacy commissioners, so you can find a situation like yours and see what the regulator decided.

How to read the tables

Each row is one published decision, grouped by type of breach.

  • Organization: the sector and size. Names are left out.
  • Information involved: what was exposed, and to whom.
  • Decision: whether the breach had to be reported, and the reason the regulator gave. The reason is the part to read. It shows what tipped the decision.
  • Reference: the regulator's decision number. Use it to read the full decision from the sources at the end.

A breach must be reported when it creates a real risk of significant harm. When comparing a row with your own breach, check four things:

  1. Was it deliberate? Phishing, ransomware, a break-in or theft made harm likely in every case, even with no proof anyone opened the records.
  2. Was it encrypted? Password protection was never enough. The one encrypted laptop was set aside entirely.
  3. What does the information reveal? An ordinary address can be sensitive when it shows someone is a psychology client or in a family dispute.
  4. Who received it, and was deletion confirmed? A stranger who deletes an email in writing is a low risk. A coworker is not.

These decisions show how past cases were decided. They do not predict yours, which depends on its own facts. The BC commissioner publishes few private-sector breach decisions, so most rows come from Alberta and the federal commissioner.

Decisions by type of breach

Email or mail sent to the wrong person

More in the accidental email disclosure playbook.

Organization Information involved Decision Reference
Psychology practice, Alberta One client's name, home address and session date, on an invoice emailed to another client Reportable. It revealed the person was a psychology client. Deletion was requested but never confirmed P2021-ND-304
Psychology practice, Alberta 18 clients' email addresses, visible to each other because "To" was used instead of "Bcc" Reportable. Each recipient could see who else was a client. No request to delete was shown P2023-ND-002
Community fitness and childcare non-profit, Alberta 10 members' email addresses on a generic payment reminder, sent without Bcc Reportable. Email addresses invite phishing and show membership. Deletion was not confirmed P2022-ND-027
Large utility, Alberta One employee's disability leave and mental health supports, emailed to a coworker Reportable, although the coworker confirmed deletion in writing. They work together in a small workplace P2023-ND-009
Telecom, national One customer's name, billing address and account number, emailed to another customer Not reportable. Not highly sensitive, the recipient was a stranger, and the email was confirmed deleted OPC breach record inspections 2019, example 2
Home security company, national Customers' names, contact details and alarm system details, shown in a portal to a small number of other customers Not reportable. The viewers were known customers, not malicious actors, so misuse was unlikely PIPEDA Findings #2024-002

Email accounts taken over by phishing

More in the phishing and email compromise playbook.

Organization Information involved Decision Reference
Company, Alberta One client's email address, in an employee's mailbox that was disabled once discovered Reportable. A deliberate intrusion, even with one person affected P2022-ND-080
Solo psychologist, Alberta Names, contact details and patient information for about 207 people. The account sent gift card scams Reportable. That no client had been approached since was not reassurance: harm can surface months or years later P2022-ND-015
Social services charity, Alberta 150 records of children and parents, including special education codes Reportable. A deliberate intrusion involving a vulnerable group P2022-ND-081
Investment firm, Alberta Social Insurance Numbers, account numbers and cheque images for 3,016 Albertans, in one inbox Reportable. Phishing compromised the inbox that held them P2023-ND-012

Ransomware and network intrusions

More in the ransomware playbook.

Organization Information involved Decision Reference
Pharmacy, Alberta Prescriptions, diagnoses and insurance plan numbers for 4,295 patients Reportable with no evidence anyone opened the records. The attacker was inside for almost four months and access could not be ruled out P2023-ND-001
Insurance broker and claims manager, international Health, medical, bank and card details, and SINs or passports for some, about 1,073 Albertans Reportable. Systems were accessed for four months and the company could not confirm what was viewed P2022-ND-028
Benefits administrator owned by a national grocer Drug names, diagnoses and treatment on benefit claims, and SINs, for about 172,872 Albertans Reportable. The attack began with one phishing file, and access could not be ruled out P2023-ND-008
Clothing retailer, national Customers' contact and loyalty details. Employees' SINs, bank accounts, pay and dependants Reportable for both groups. Data was likely stolen P2023-ND-003
Mining company Employees' SINs, pay and direct deposit details and employee files, about 50 Albertans Reportable. A ransom demand, and employee files that could cause embarrassment P2023-ND-018
Private career colleges, Alberta Students' and employees' identity and financial details, and dental clinic patients' information Reportable. The colleges did not report, citing no hard evidence. The commissioner required notice anyway P2023-ND-020

Breaches at a supplier

More in the vendor breach playbook.

Organization Information involved Decision Reference
Insurance brokerage, Alberta Driver's licences, driving records, banking and card details for up to 7,000 people, held by its cloud host Reportable. The host was hit by ransomware and gave no answer on what was taken. The duty stayed with the brokerage P2023-ND-016
Electricity transmission company, Alberta Resumes, interview comments and contact details of about 10,000 job applicants, held by a recruitment software vendor Reportable. Data was stolen and an extortion demand followed P2023-ND-010
Credit card issuer SINs, debt amounts and contact details of 731 cardholders, held by a debt collection agency Reportable, though the issuer's own systems were never touched P2022-ND-082
Professional services firm, international Health, financial and SIN details of 2,474 Albertans, through a flaw in file transfer software Reportable. The firm said there was no real risk. The commissioner disagreed: the data was stolen and published P2024-ND-001
National charity Records of separated families and detainees, held in an international partner's system Reportable. A deliberate intrusion lasting about two months P2022-ND-083

Lost or stolen laptops, servers and paper

More in the lost or stolen device playbook and the physical records playbook.

Organization Information involved Decision Reference
Small law office, Alberta SINs, tax returns, bank statements and client correspondence for about 4,000 people, on a server and backup drive stolen together Reportable. Password protected but not encrypted, and never recovered P2023-ND-015
Family law firm, Alberta Draft affidavits describing family disputes for 4 clients, on a laptop stolen from a car Reportable. Password protected but not encrypted P2022-ND-056
Insurance agency branch, Alberta SINs and driver's licence copies for 16 clients, on a laptop stolen in an office break-in Reportable. Two passwords, but not encrypted P2022-ND-068
Preschool, Alberta Children's health card numbers, family contacts and billing details, on a computer and an emergency backpack Reportable. A theft, involving children P2022-ND-066
Welding company, through its insurance broker Employees' names, birth dates and driver's licence numbers on a paper form, stolen from a car with an encrypted laptop Reportable because of the paper. The encrypted laptop, wiped remotely, was found to carry no likelihood of harm P2022-ND-079
Law firm, Alberta Driver's licence copies, cheques and mortgage documents for 10 clients, taken from an employee's car Reportable. Paper files are judged by the same test as a laptop P2022-ND-026
Telecom, national Payment details and driver's licence numbers for up to 8,000 customers, on a lost laptop Reportable. Sensitive, unprotected and in quantity OPC breach record inspections 2019, example 3

Data exposed online, websites and stolen passwords

More in the cloud storage playbook and the website compromise playbook.

Organization Information involved Decision Reference
Online retailer, national Names, birth dates, contact details and order history for 63,759 Albertans, in cloud storage left public for over two years Reportable. The file was posted on a breach forum and could not be taken down P2023-ND-013
Retail chain, national Card numbers, expiry dates and security codes from its online checkout, 1,877 Albertans Reportable. Malicious code ran on the checkout for two months P2023-ND-004
Online marketplace, international Names, phone numbers, email addresses and birth dates for 760 Albertans, through a faulty interface Reportable. The data was offered for sale P2023-ND-005
Password manager provider, international Contact details, login security codes and encrypted password vaults for about 128,000 Albertans Reportable. The unencrypted parts, and weak master passwords, could open other accounts P2023-ND-014
Payment company, international Names, birth dates, addresses, phone numbers, and proof that stolen logins worked, for 255 Albertans Reportable. Working logins can be tried on other accounts P2023-ND-011
Hotel and casino company, international Names, contact details and birth dates for 1.9 million Canadians, and government ID numbers for 5,635 Reportable, and reported too late. The company did not assess the risk promptly PIPEDA Findings #2022-004

Former employees

More in the unauthorized employee access playbook.

Organization Information involved Decision Reference
Car dealership, Alberta Names, birth dates, contact details and purchase history of about 10,000 customers, kept by a former employee who emailed them Reportable. Spam alone is not significant harm. Deliberate misuse and impersonating the business made fraud likely P2022-ND-062

What investigations found

When a regulator investigates, it looks at the safeguards that allowed the breach. These involve large organizations, but the gaps are ones any business can close.

Organization Information involved Finding Reference
Agricultural supplier SINs, banking details and passports for 845 people, taken in a ransomware attack No multi-factor authentication, network separation, encryption or attack detection. No privacy policy and nobody accountable for privacy PIPEDA Findings #2023-002
Hotel chain, international About 12.8 million Canadian guest records, including about 86,000 passport records, some stored unencrypted Safeguards, accountability and retention all fell short. Its notification was found adequate PIPEDA Findings #2022-005
Bank, national SINs, account numbers and transaction histories of 113,154 customers, through a flaw in online banking Testing, bot defences and monitoring were inadequate for information that sensitive PIPEDA Findings #2021-003
Genetic testing company, international Personal information of almost 320,000 people in Canada, taken over five months by logging in with reused passwords Safeguards against reused-password attacks, and monitoring of account activity, were inadequate PIPEDA Findings #2025-001
Medical laboratory, national Health information of about 8.6 million customers, mostly in Ontario and BC Did not take reasonable steps to protect the information. Security policies were inadequate OIPC BC Investigation Report 20-02

Privacy case of the month

Once a month, a five-minute read: a real case a Canadian privacy commissioner investigated, what went wrong, and what to check in your own organization so it doesn't happen to you. Written for organizations under federal, Alberta and BC privacy law. Not written for Quebec.

We send one email to confirm. Nothing else arrives until you confirm, and an unconfirmed address is deleted after 7 days. Sent by ClearBreach Technologies Inc. Mailing address and contact details · Privacy policy

Where to go from here

Sources

This guide is educational and does not constitute legal advice. It is grounded in the text of PIPEDA, Alberta PIPA, and BC PIPA and published guidance from the OPC, OIPC Alberta, and OIPC BC. If your situation involves regulatory investigation, litigation risk, or circumstances not addressed here, engage a qualified privacy lawyer.

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