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How Canadian Regulators Decide Whether a Breach Must Be Reported
By Yong DuPublished Reviewed
One misdirected invoice had to be reported and another did not. Real Canadian breach decisions, case by case.
On this page
A psychology practice emailed one client's invoice to the wrong client, and had to report it. A telecom emailed one customer's account number to the wrong customer, and did not. The tables below show real decisions from Canada's federal, Alberta and BC privacy commissioners, so you can find a situation like yours and see what the regulator decided.
How to read the tables
Each row is one published decision, grouped by type of breach.
- Organization: the sector and size. Names are left out.
- Information involved: what was exposed, and to whom.
- Decision: whether the breach had to be reported, and the reason the regulator gave. The reason is the part to read. It shows what tipped the decision.
- Reference: the regulator's decision number. Use it to read the full decision from the sources at the end.
A breach must be reported when it creates a real risk of significant harm. When comparing a row with your own breach, check four things:
- Was it deliberate? Phishing, ransomware, a break-in or theft made harm likely in every case, even with no proof anyone opened the records.
- Was it encrypted? Password protection was never enough. The one encrypted laptop was set aside entirely.
- What does the information reveal? An ordinary address can be sensitive when it shows someone is a psychology client or in a family dispute.
- Who received it, and was deletion confirmed? A stranger who deletes an email in writing is a low risk. A coworker is not.
These decisions show how past cases were decided. They do not predict yours, which depends on its own facts. The BC commissioner publishes few private-sector breach decisions, so most rows come from Alberta and the federal commissioner.
Decisions by type of breach
Email or mail sent to the wrong person
More in the accidental email disclosure playbook.
| Organization | Information involved | Decision | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Psychology practice, Alberta | One client's name, home address and session date, on an invoice emailed to another client | Reportable. It revealed the person was a psychology client. Deletion was requested but never confirmed | P2021-ND-304 |
| Psychology practice, Alberta | 18 clients' email addresses, visible to each other because "To" was used instead of "Bcc" | Reportable. Each recipient could see who else was a client. No request to delete was shown | P2023-ND-002 |
| Community fitness and childcare non-profit, Alberta | 10 members' email addresses on a generic payment reminder, sent without Bcc | Reportable. Email addresses invite phishing and show membership. Deletion was not confirmed | P2022-ND-027 |
| Large utility, Alberta | One employee's disability leave and mental health supports, emailed to a coworker | Reportable, although the coworker confirmed deletion in writing. They work together in a small workplace | P2023-ND-009 |
| Telecom, national | One customer's name, billing address and account number, emailed to another customer | Not reportable. Not highly sensitive, the recipient was a stranger, and the email was confirmed deleted | OPC breach record inspections 2019, example 2 |
| Home security company, national | Customers' names, contact details and alarm system details, shown in a portal to a small number of other customers | Not reportable. The viewers were known customers, not malicious actors, so misuse was unlikely | PIPEDA Findings #2024-002 |
Email accounts taken over by phishing
More in the phishing and email compromise playbook.
| Organization | Information involved | Decision | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Company, Alberta | One client's email address, in an employee's mailbox that was disabled once discovered | Reportable. A deliberate intrusion, even with one person affected | P2022-ND-080 |
| Solo psychologist, Alberta | Names, contact details and patient information for about 207 people. The account sent gift card scams | Reportable. That no client had been approached since was not reassurance: harm can surface months or years later | P2022-ND-015 |
| Social services charity, Alberta | 150 records of children and parents, including special education codes | Reportable. A deliberate intrusion involving a vulnerable group | P2022-ND-081 |
| Investment firm, Alberta | Social Insurance Numbers, account numbers and cheque images for 3,016 Albertans, in one inbox | Reportable. Phishing compromised the inbox that held them | P2023-ND-012 |
Ransomware and network intrusions
More in the ransomware playbook.
| Organization | Information involved | Decision | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pharmacy, Alberta | Prescriptions, diagnoses and insurance plan numbers for 4,295 patients | Reportable with no evidence anyone opened the records. The attacker was inside for almost four months and access could not be ruled out | P2023-ND-001 |
| Insurance broker and claims manager, international | Health, medical, bank and card details, and SINs or passports for some, about 1,073 Albertans | Reportable. Systems were accessed for four months and the company could not confirm what was viewed | P2022-ND-028 |
| Benefits administrator owned by a national grocer | Drug names, diagnoses and treatment on benefit claims, and SINs, for about 172,872 Albertans | Reportable. The attack began with one phishing file, and access could not be ruled out | P2023-ND-008 |
| Clothing retailer, national | Customers' contact and loyalty details. Employees' SINs, bank accounts, pay and dependants | Reportable for both groups. Data was likely stolen | P2023-ND-003 |
| Mining company | Employees' SINs, pay and direct deposit details and employee files, about 50 Albertans | Reportable. A ransom demand, and employee files that could cause embarrassment | P2023-ND-018 |
| Private career colleges, Alberta | Students' and employees' identity and financial details, and dental clinic patients' information | Reportable. The colleges did not report, citing no hard evidence. The commissioner required notice anyway | P2023-ND-020 |
Breaches at a supplier
More in the vendor breach playbook.
| Organization | Information involved | Decision | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Insurance brokerage, Alberta | Driver's licences, driving records, banking and card details for up to 7,000 people, held by its cloud host | Reportable. The host was hit by ransomware and gave no answer on what was taken. The duty stayed with the brokerage | P2023-ND-016 |
| Electricity transmission company, Alberta | Resumes, interview comments and contact details of about 10,000 job applicants, held by a recruitment software vendor | Reportable. Data was stolen and an extortion demand followed | P2023-ND-010 |
| Credit card issuer | SINs, debt amounts and contact details of 731 cardholders, held by a debt collection agency | Reportable, though the issuer's own systems were never touched | P2022-ND-082 |
| Professional services firm, international | Health, financial and SIN details of 2,474 Albertans, through a flaw in file transfer software | Reportable. The firm said there was no real risk. The commissioner disagreed: the data was stolen and published | P2024-ND-001 |
| National charity | Records of separated families and detainees, held in an international partner's system | Reportable. A deliberate intrusion lasting about two months | P2022-ND-083 |
Lost or stolen laptops, servers and paper
More in the lost or stolen device playbook and the physical records playbook.
| Organization | Information involved | Decision | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Small law office, Alberta | SINs, tax returns, bank statements and client correspondence for about 4,000 people, on a server and backup drive stolen together | Reportable. Password protected but not encrypted, and never recovered | P2023-ND-015 |
| Family law firm, Alberta | Draft affidavits describing family disputes for 4 clients, on a laptop stolen from a car | Reportable. Password protected but not encrypted | P2022-ND-056 |
| Insurance agency branch, Alberta | SINs and driver's licence copies for 16 clients, on a laptop stolen in an office break-in | Reportable. Two passwords, but not encrypted | P2022-ND-068 |
| Preschool, Alberta | Children's health card numbers, family contacts and billing details, on a computer and an emergency backpack | Reportable. A theft, involving children | P2022-ND-066 |
| Welding company, through its insurance broker | Employees' names, birth dates and driver's licence numbers on a paper form, stolen from a car with an encrypted laptop | Reportable because of the paper. The encrypted laptop, wiped remotely, was found to carry no likelihood of harm | P2022-ND-079 |
| Law firm, Alberta | Driver's licence copies, cheques and mortgage documents for 10 clients, taken from an employee's car | Reportable. Paper files are judged by the same test as a laptop | P2022-ND-026 |
| Telecom, national | Payment details and driver's licence numbers for up to 8,000 customers, on a lost laptop | Reportable. Sensitive, unprotected and in quantity | OPC breach record inspections 2019, example 3 |
Data exposed online, websites and stolen passwords
More in the cloud storage playbook and the website compromise playbook.
| Organization | Information involved | Decision | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Online retailer, national | Names, birth dates, contact details and order history for 63,759 Albertans, in cloud storage left public for over two years | Reportable. The file was posted on a breach forum and could not be taken down | P2023-ND-013 |
| Retail chain, national | Card numbers, expiry dates and security codes from its online checkout, 1,877 Albertans | Reportable. Malicious code ran on the checkout for two months | P2023-ND-004 |
| Online marketplace, international | Names, phone numbers, email addresses and birth dates for 760 Albertans, through a faulty interface | Reportable. The data was offered for sale | P2023-ND-005 |
| Password manager provider, international | Contact details, login security codes and encrypted password vaults for about 128,000 Albertans | Reportable. The unencrypted parts, and weak master passwords, could open other accounts | P2023-ND-014 |
| Payment company, international | Names, birth dates, addresses, phone numbers, and proof that stolen logins worked, for 255 Albertans | Reportable. Working logins can be tried on other accounts | P2023-ND-011 |
| Hotel and casino company, international | Names, contact details and birth dates for 1.9 million Canadians, and government ID numbers for 5,635 | Reportable, and reported too late. The company did not assess the risk promptly | PIPEDA Findings #2022-004 |
Former employees
More in the unauthorized employee access playbook.
| Organization | Information involved | Decision | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Car dealership, Alberta | Names, birth dates, contact details and purchase history of about 10,000 customers, kept by a former employee who emailed them | Reportable. Spam alone is not significant harm. Deliberate misuse and impersonating the business made fraud likely | P2022-ND-062 |
What investigations found
When a regulator investigates, it looks at the safeguards that allowed the breach. These involve large organizations, but the gaps are ones any business can close.
| Organization | Information involved | Finding | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Agricultural supplier | SINs, banking details and passports for 845 people, taken in a ransomware attack | No multi-factor authentication, network separation, encryption or attack detection. No privacy policy and nobody accountable for privacy | PIPEDA Findings #2023-002 |
| Hotel chain, international | About 12.8 million Canadian guest records, including about 86,000 passport records, some stored unencrypted | Safeguards, accountability and retention all fell short. Its notification was found adequate | PIPEDA Findings #2022-005 |
| Bank, national | SINs, account numbers and transaction histories of 113,154 customers, through a flaw in online banking | Testing, bot defences and monitoring were inadequate for information that sensitive | PIPEDA Findings #2021-003 |
| Genetic testing company, international | Personal information of almost 320,000 people in Canada, taken over five months by logging in with reused passwords | Safeguards against reused-password attacks, and monitoring of account activity, were inadequate | PIPEDA Findings #2025-001 |
| Medical laboratory, national | Health information of about 8.6 million customers, mostly in Ontario and BC | Did not take reasonable steps to protect the information. Security policies were inadequate | OIPC BC Investigation Report 20-02 |
Privacy case of the month
Once a month, a five-minute read: a real case a Canadian privacy commissioner investigated, what went wrong, and what to check in your own organization so it doesn't happen to you. Written for organizations under federal, Alberta and BC privacy law. Not written for Quebec.
We send one email to confirm. Nothing else arrives until you confirm, and an unconfirmed address is deleted after 7 days. Sent by ClearBreach Technologies Inc. Mailing address and contact details · Privacy policy
Where to go from here
- Dealing with a breach now? Start with the data breach response checklist.
- Deciding whether you need help with this? Read is ClearBreach right for your business?
Sources
- OIPC Alberta: decisions numbered P20XX-ND-XXX are listed on the breach notification decisions page.
- OPC: PIPEDA Findings are listed under investigations into businesses. The two inspection examples are from the OPC's 2019 breach record inspections.
- OIPC BC: investigation reports are listed under investigation and audit reports.
This guide is educational and does not constitute legal advice. It is grounded in the text of PIPEDA, Alberta PIPA, and BC PIPA and published guidance from the OPC, OIPC Alberta, and OIPC BC. If your situation involves regulatory investigation, litigation risk, or circumstances not addressed here, engage a qualified privacy lawyer.
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